Investors are shrugging off the suggestion that stocks are over-valued or that the technology innovators are a one-way path to riches if the year-to-date performance of Tesla Motors (TSLA) and Facebook (FB) are any indication. Twitter’s stock (TWTR), which soared from a $45 closing price on its first day of trading (November 7, 2013) to a high of $73.30 on December 26, has fallen 32% since the start of 2014. Twitter is now trading at slightly below $45. Given the excitement surrounding the Twitter IPO less than six months ago, what does this apparent reversal of (expected) fortunes suggest? It is certainly too soon to conclude that a business model that made sense at the IPO has proven to be faulty. Does Twitter’s dramatic decline signal a shift in investors’ willingness to bet heavily on a future earnings stream that is almost impossible to predict? Continue reading
In the financial advisory business, one of the most pressing and controversial topics is how much money people need to save during their working years in order to provide for long-term retirement income. The research on this topic has evolved quite a lot in recent years, and a recent issue of Money magazine features a series of articles representing the current view on this critical topic. These articles, based around interviews with a number of the current thought leaders on this topic, deserve to be widely read and discussed.
The series of articles in Money kicks off with perspectives by Wade Pfau. Pfau’s introductory piece suggests a difficult future for American workers. A traditional rule-of-thumb in retirement planning is called the 4% rule. This rule states that a retiree can plan to draw annual income equal to 4% of the value of her portfolio in the first year of retirement and increase this amount each year to keep up with inflation. Someone who retires with a $1 Million portfolio could draw $40,000 in income in the first year of retirement and then increase that by 2.5%-3% per year, and have a high level of confidence that the portfolio will last thirty years. It is assumed that the portfolio is invested in 60%-70% stocks and 30%-40% bonds. The 4% rule was originally derived based on the long-term historical returns and risks for stocks and bonds. The problem that Pfau has noted, however, is that both stocks and bonds are fairly expensive today relative to their values over the period of time used to calculate the 4% rule. For bonds, this means that yields are well below their historical averages and historical yields are a good predictor of the future return from bonds. The expected return from stocks is partly determined by the average price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio, and the P/E for stocks is currently well-above the long-term historical average. High P/E tends to predict lower future returns for stocks, and vice versa. For a detailed discussion of these relationships, see this paper. In light of current prices of stocks and bonds, Pfau concludes that the 4% rule is far too optimistic and proposes that investors plan for something closer to a 3% draw rate from their portfolios in retirement. I also explored this topic in an article last year.
Income inequality is increasingly acknowledged as a key economic issue for the world. The topic is a major theme at Davos this year. Economic inequality is also an increasingly common topic in U.S. politics.
A new study has found that economic mobility does not appear to have changed appreciably over the past thirty years, even as the wealth gap has grown enormously. The authors analyzed the probability that a child born into the poorest 20% of households would move into the top 20% of households as an adult. The numbers have not changed in three decades.
On the other hand, there is clearly a substantial accumulation of wealth at the top of the socioeconomic scale. The richest 1% of Americans now own 25% of all of the wealth in the U.S. The share of national income accruing to the richest 1% has doubled since 1980. In contrast, median household income has shown no gains, adjusted for inflation, since the late 1980’s and has dropped substantially from its previous peak in the late 1990’s.
Why is this happening?
One of the least-understood aspects of investing among individual investors is the total costs associated with building and maintaining a portfolio. In comparison to the huge rises and falls that we see in the market, the expenses associated with mutual funds or brokerage costs may sound small. Over long periods of time, however, the ups and downs of the market tend to average out. The effect of those costs however is persistent and continuous.
There are a range of costs associated with investing in funds beyond the stated expense ratio. In a new article in the Financial Analysts Journal, John Bogle presents a new summary of the average all-in costs associated with investing in stock index funds and in actively-managed stock funds. Mr. Bogle is a long-term and tireless advocate of the idea that actively-managed mutual funds are a mistake for investors, so the content of the article is not surprising. He has written similar pieces in the past. In this article, he provides updated numbers, backed up by a range of academic analysis. His summary of costs is provided in Table 1 of his article:
There are three types of expenses, in addition to the standard expense ratio. First are transaction costs, which are simply a fund’s trading costs. This cost includes brokerage fees incurred by the fund, the impact of the bid-ask spread, and related expenses. Mr. Bogle estimates this cost at 0.5% per year for active funds and at 0% for index funds. He justifies the zero cost for index funds on the basis of the fact that the long-term returns of index funds are essentially identical to the performance of the index net of the index funds’ expense ratio. The second source of additional cost for active funds is cash drag. Many actively managed funds are not fully invested all of the time and carry a portion of their assets in cash. To the extent that this cash does not accrue returns comparable to the equity index, this is a drag on performance. Mr. Bogle estimates this lost return due to cash holdings at 0.15% per year. The final additional cost that Mr. Bogle includes is sales charges / fees. This cost is supposed to capture sales loads and any incremental costs associated with an investment advisor such as advisory fees. Mr. Bogle freely acknowledges that this cost estimate is exceedingly open for debate.
When he adds all of these costs together, Mr. Bogle estimates that the average actively-managed fund costs investors 2.27% per year as compared to the market index, while the index fund costs only 0.06% per year.
The Investment Company Institute (ICI) estimates that the asset-weighted average expense ratio of actively-managed mutual funds is 0.92% per year, for reference. The ICI also reports that the most expensive funds can have much higher expense ratios. They find that the most expensive 10% of equity funds have an average expense ratio of 2.2%.
Mr. Bogle, in his examples, assumes that stocks will return an average of 7% per year. This number is highly uncertain. The trailing 10-year annualized return of the S&P500 is 6.8% per year, but the trailing 15-year annualized return for the S&P500 is 4.2%. A 2.2% total expense is more than 30% of the total return from investing in the stock market if the market returns 7%. Because of compounding, the long-term impact of these costs increases over time.
The average costs from Mr. Bogle’s article are not unreasonable. There are probably many investors paying this much or more. On the other hand, there are plenty of investors in active funds paying considerably less.
Where does all of this leave investors? First and foremost, it should be clear that costs matter a great deal. There will always be expenses associated with investing, but they vary widely. Over a lifetime, managing the expenses of investing can have a dramatic impact on your ability to build substantial savings. Whether or not you believe that actively-managed funds are worth their cost, every investor should know their own asset-weighted expense ratio.
- It’s Different This Time for Tech Stock Valuations
- Why Investing in Stocks in the Headlines Is Not a Good Idea
- The Inflation Paradox at the End of 2013
- The Facebook IPO: Why Gambling with Your Portfolio Rarely Pays Off
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Guest post by Richard (Rick) A. Ferri, CFA, founder of Portfolio Solutions.
Unconventional success from an investment strategy leads to failure for most investors. The excess gains earned by the early adopters of a new investment idea quickly dissipate as growing crowds become increasingly unsophisticated and push down returns. It doesn’t take long before the average return from the strategy falls well below a simple portfolio of index funds. Continue reading
Guest post by Contributing Editor, Robert P. Seawright, Chief Investment and Information Officer for Madison Avenue Securities.
Value has persistently outperformed over the long-term. Why is that?
In the most general terms, growth stocks are those with growing positive attributes – like price, sales, earnings, profits, and return on equity. Value stocks, on the other hand, are stocks that are underpriced when compared to some measure of their relative value – like price to earnings, price to book, and dividend yield. Thus growth stocks trade at higher prices relative to various fundamental measures of their value because (at least in theory) the market is pricing in the potential for future earnings growth. Over relatively long periods of time, each of these investing classes can and do outperform the other. For example, growth investing dominated the 1990s while value investing has outperformed since. But value wins over the long haul. Continue reading
I have known Phil DeMuth for a number of years and I admire his common sense and views on many topics. Phil authored the recently-published book The Affluent Investor that fills a need in the crowded shelves of investment books. As a financial advisor to high-net-worth families, Phil brings valuable perspective to investors who have built substantial portfolios and seek to protect and grow their wealth effectively. Continue reading
Jason Zweig at the Wall Street Journal published a disturbing article that deserves more attention. The basic story is this. A number of banks sold a complex financial product to retail investors who have subsequently lost quite a bit of money. Here is the basic pitch that was apparently made to individual investors in 2012. You are going to buy an investment product that is currently invested in bonds and is producing 8% in income per year. The performance of this product is tied to the stock price of Apple, however. In exchange for the high income, you take on the risk of a decline in Apple’s stock price. These products were sold when Apple stock was soaring, so a fair number of people apparently saw this as a favorable bet. With the stock down more than 30% from its peak, many of these investors have lost a considerable amount of money. Read Zweig’s piece for more details. These products have a number of variations and he discusses one specific structure. Here is another. The title of Zweig’s article, How Apple Bit Bondholders, Too, gives the impression that bonds were responsible for these losses. This is not the case, but the title serves to illustrate the subtlety of the problem. Continue reading
There is increasing evidence of big flows of money into equities and leaving bonds. This is being seen at all levels in the market, including among institutional investors such as pension plans. The Wall Street Journal just published an article discussing this shift called Are Mom and Pop Heading for Wall Street? Mutual fund flows suggest that investors are finally returning to equities, after selling in droves over the past several years. This article summarizes the issue:
From April 2009 through now, mutual-fund investors sold a quarter trillion dollars in stock funds, according to recent data from the Investment Company Institute.
Ironically, that selloff coincided with a period of stellar performance in stocks—when the Dow Jones Industrial Average jumped more than 60%. Continue reading
Folio Investing’s Successful ETF-Based Alternative to Legacy Target-Date Funds Offers Superior Diversification, Risk Targeting and Flexibility; Firm Seeks Distribution Partner to Broaden Availability
Folio Investing announced today that, over the five years since they were brought to market in December 2007, its Target Date Folios have significantly outperformed traditional target-date funds. The Folios have provided both higher returns and lower volatility than the competing funds during this tumultuous period. Continue reading